In Search of an IMPROVED Science and Public-Policy Process
Taking the lead from the play Cabaret, I assert that it is "both substance and process that makes
the world go 'round." Usually, it is preferable to write about substance, but this brief paper will
attempt to deal with the unglamorous issues of "process."
Historians tell us that there are many driving forces of history, such as the forces of great
persons, the forces that divide or unite nations, and the forces between competing economic
systems. My personal conclusion is that science and technology is the foremost driving force of
history. What we scientists and engineers discover, the industrialists will produce and society
will consume. Take away modern agricultural, military, transportation and communication
technologies and a very different society appears. It is clear that society is not going to follow the
mythical Ned Ludd to destroy our looms, autos and CD players.
Along with this primal role of creation, physicists have the concomitant responsibility to do our
best to determine the impacts of implementation. This is serious business. There is no room for
errors of omission or commission. Because the stakes are very high and because science means
knowledge, we are obligated to be honest, objective, and open. Too often our analysis fails to
mention major uncertainties and competing issues that are not directly comparable. It is our job
to lay out all the facts and ask the hard questions.
In my talk at the APS spring meeting, I gave some examples of issues in which I observed a less
than stellar science/technology (S/T) policy process, such as:
--nuclear
---

lurching towards a plutonium policy in the 1970s
determining the appropriate level of
deterrence during the Cold War
debating the extent and significance of Soviet cheating
considering a 2 mGauss standard for powerlines.

These and other examples have convinced me that the S/T decision process needs help. I would
argue that today's general cynicism of rational thought undercuts S/T policy process. As part of
this, the anti-science movement has contributed to an environment in which the issues can be
clouded and mishandled. This movement is not new -- it has been with us before Galileo was put
under house arrest. Our main hope is the credibility of our scientific citizens who use an open,
peer-reviewed process to state our limitations and uncertainties. Some ideas on improving the
S/T public policy process are:
1. Individual ethics. The 1991 APS statement on "Guidelines for Professional Conduct" and the
1993 AAAS position paper on "Good Science and Responsible Scientists" are excellent
statements -- as far as they go -- on nonfabrication of data, authorship, peer review and conflict
of interests. In my view, the importance of S/T issues demands a stricter, more pro-active code of
ethics. This demands a discussion of:
-- uncertainties, ranges of estimates in numbers, and opinions and lists of omissions

-- criteria, such as Hill's on epidemiology, for replicability, linearity for small effects, plausibility
with regard to basic laws, coherence of data, possible confounders, economics, etc.
-- peer-review comments from a wide group of reviewers
-- condemnation of those who favor your conclusions, but who use data incorrectly or overstate
the case
-- responses to questions from nonpartisan ombudsmen who represent truth-seeking as compared
to advocacy.
2. A non-adjudicatory process to determine areas of agreement and disagreement. In the 1970s,
there was a flurry of interest in Arthur Kantrowitz's concept[1] of the Science Court in which
scientific experts would be the judges and "case managers." These individuals were to be
unconnected to the dispute with the hope of removing hard-charging advocacy. The science court
was not to be empowered to make judicial decisions, but only to give recommendations to the
courts or decision makers.
For a variety of conflicting reasons, the Science Court did not survive, but an excellent result
appeared from its byproduct, the Scientific Adversary Procedure. In 1985, under the leadership
of Kantrowitz, Edward Gerry (in favor of SDI) and Richard Garwin (in opposition) discussed
under formal procedures and drew up a list of agreed statements that both could support. If the
fifteen agreed statements had been widely publicized and ultimately accepted as honest output
from two excellent scientists who fundamentally disagreed, the SDI debate could have been
narrowed and made more rational. For example, consider statement #9: "In the continuing
context of deterrence of nuclear war by threat of retaliation, technologies already exist to solve
the problem of strategic force vulnerability sooner and at a lower cost than via layered defense
with space components." Acceptance of this statement would have clearly helped to narrow the
many classified technical meetings on SDI which I attended during the 1980s. At the time, it
seemed that the government was locked into an unjustified kill probability of 0.9 in its
discussions of the highly complex "preferential targeting" of reentry vehicles. If the GarwinGerry results had been read in executive branch and congressional meetings, it would have
considerably raised the level of discussion.
3. Questions for the record. Sometimes the Congress has done a good job of handling
controversial S/T issues, but often it has not. The Congress has a unique opportunity to produce
hearing records with penetrating follow-up questions from and to experts. However, the
members of Congress often feel that hearing records are of little importance and they are often
printed after the issue has been settled. These decisions are often made by non-scientists who
don't care about setting the record straight and don't worry about clarifying the issues. For
example, the concern that nuclear waste to be stored at Yucca Mountain might explode could
have been rapidly clarified with some penetrating technical questions to those on both sides of
the issue. It would not have taken a great deal of effort to show what had and had not been
calculated. Of course the National Academy of Science can and does perform this task, but it
often seems to take too long for the NAS to produce its product and the system often doesn't

know how to absorb it. And, of course, we can all think of an Academy study that we thought
was wrong!
4. Benevolent Ombudspersons. Science must be honest, objective, and open, and the same holds
for S/T policy. If two divergent groups of honest scientists could work together and prepare an
annual report of errors and overstatements on the S/T issues, this would put pressure on scientists
to pay attention to the code of ethics discussed above. The American Physical Society has the
credible intellectual talent to do this, but I can't imagine the APS would want to get involved in
all of the issues. Perhaps two nongovernmental organizations with differing constituents could
develop panels of impeccable scientists to ask questions of the proponents and assess who went
beyond the truth. This begins to sound like "Accuracy in the Media," but I am hopeful that our
scientific training would make the difference for removing "lies, damn-lies and bad statistics."
5. Other. I am still searching for the perfect wave. Paraphrasing A.E. Houseman's "A Shropshire
Lad;"
When I was one-and-twenty
I heard a wise man say
"Give me scientific facts and logical thought
and the society will choose wisely."
Now I am almost two-and-sixty,
And Oh, 'tis not always true, 'tis not always true.
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